All Journals

Language Teaching Research Quarterly

European Journal of Studies in Management and Business

International Journal of Behavior Studies in Organizations

Studies in Educational Management

New Challenges in Accounting and Finance

Language Testing in Focus: An International Journal

Marketing and Branding Research

Individual Differences in Language Education: An International Journal 

Feedback Research in Second Language 

Management Issues in Healthcare System

Language Teacher Education Research

Artificial Intelligence Knowledge Development

<p style="text-align:justify;">The research objective is&nbsp;&nbsp;to verify if the variable compensation of&nbsp;executives is established based on the relative performance evaluation, based&nbsp;on their abilities, or if there is the so-called "lucky payment", in&nbsp;which they are benefited or harmed by oscillations that affect the entire&nbsp;market. The literature shows that variable remuneration is characterized as one&nbsp;of the main mechanisms to align interests between investors and executives. In&nbsp;Brazil, there is evidence of a relationship between variable remuneration and&nbsp;managers' performance, but a gap to be filled consists of identifying whether&nbsp;or not such remuneration disregards the systematic component of performance,&nbsp;linked to movements and shocks that affect the entire sector. The sample&nbsp;comprises the listed companies listed in B3, except those operating in&nbsp;regulated segments, such as financial institutions and public utilities. The&nbsp;period of analysis comprises the years 2010 to 2015, where the information on&nbsp;remuneration is now disclosed through the Reference Form. After self-selection&nbsp;control, because of companies that filed injunctions to avoid disclosure of&nbsp;executive compensation, evidence indicates that executives are usually paid&nbsp;"by luck." Only when the market performs negatively and the executive&nbsp;performs above it is that relative performance employed. The research assists&nbsp;in a better understanding of the remuneration policy of Brazilian&nbsp;organizations, complementing other research on the temporal aspect and the&nbsp;comparison of the peers' performances in the sectors.</p>

Executive Compensation and Relative Performance Evaluation Relationship Analysis

Original Research 

JBSO.2020.04.02.xml